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Abstract
In this note we consider the following problem to study the effect of malicious players
on the social optimum in load balancing games: Consider two players SOC and MAL
controlling (1 − α) and α fraction of the flow in a load balancing game. SOC tries to
minimize the total cost faced by her players while MAL tries to maximize the same.
If the latencies are linear, we show that this 2-player zero-sum game has a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium. Moreover, we show that one of the optimal strategies for MAL is to
play selfishly: let the α fraction of the flow be sent as when the flow was controlled by
infinitesimal players playing selfishly and reaching a Nash equilibrium. This shows that
a malicious player cannot cause more harm in this game than a set of selfish agents.
We also introduce the notion of Cost of Malice - the ratio of the cost faced by SOC at
equilibrium to (1− α)OPT, where OPT is the social optimum minimizing the cost of all
the players. In linear load balancing games we bound the cost of malice by (1 + α/2).
1 Introduction
Games played by a large number of people in a decentralized manner seem to be susceptible
to malicious players and it becomes important to understand the performance degradation
due to the presence of malice. A particular class of games which have come under focus are
congestion games. An example where malicious activity can degrade the performance of a
congestion network, is a Denial of Service attack on a web-server. In the past few years there
have been studies [[BKP07],[MSW06],[KV07]] investigating the effect of malicious players on
the other rational but non-cooperative players of the game.
We study the effect of malicious players in non-atomic congestion games from a centralized
viewpoint. In particular, we investigate how adversely the presence of malicious entities can
affect the social optimum of a congestion game. It is probably not very surprising that in
general congestion games malicious players can affect the social optimum badly (and we make
it precise how adversely later). In the special case of linear load balancing games, however,
we make the following observations.
In a load-balancing game, we have m parallel links joining a single pair of a source and a
sink. One unit of flow is to be distributed on the links. Each link i has a latency li : [0, 1]→ R+
which is assumed to be non-decreasing. If z is the amount of flow through a link i, then the
cost of sending an infinitesimal portion ∆z of the flow on that link is li(z) ·∆z. We consider
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two players: MAL and SOC controlling α and (1 − α) fraction of the flow. The SOC player
wishes to minimize the cost faced by his fraction of the flow, while the MAL player wishes to
maximize this cost. We call this zero-sum game Gα.
Formally, a pure strategy of the SOC (and similarly, of the MAL) player is an allocation
of flow on the m links given by the vector y = {y1, · · · , ym) (and similarly x = (x1, · · · , xm))
with
∑m
k=1 yk = (1− α) (and similarly
∑m
k=1 xk = α). The cost faced by the SOC player on
playing the strategy y while the MAL player plays x is
C(x,y) =
m∑
k=1
yklk(xk + yk)
The SOC player wishes to minimize this cost while the MAL player wishes to maximize
it. This defines the game Gα.
Remark: A mixed strategy P is a probability distribution over pure strategies, i.e. a
player plays a mixed strategy P is she plays a pure strategy z with probability P (z). Since
we have a continuum of pure strategies in Gα, one may think that an equilibrium in mixed
strategies would imply an equilibrium in pure strategies by simply replacing a mixed strategy
P by a pure strategy zˆ =
∑
z P (z)z. Following example shows that this implication does not
hold, at least by above trivial transformation. If SOC plays a mixed strategy P and MAL
plays x, then
Expected cost to SOC =
∑
y
P (y)
m∑
k=1
yklk(yk + xk) =
m∑
k=1
∑
y
(P (y)yklk(yk + xk))
Instead, if SOC plays yˆ =
∑
y P (y)y in response to MAL’s pure strategy x, we get
C(x, yˆ) =
m∑
k=1
yˆklk(yˆk + xk)
=
m∑
k=1
(∑
y
P (y)yk
)
lk((
∑
y
P (y)yk) + xk)
=
m∑
k=1
(∑
y
P (y)yk
)∑
y
(P (y)lk(yk + xk))
Notice that the costs are different in the two cases. Therefore, our results for pure strategies
are non-trivially stronger than their possible counterparts for mixed strategies - which them-
selves do not follow from classical theorems since the strategy space is a continuum.
Our main result is that there exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a linear load-
balancing game Gα. Since the game is zero-sum, equivalently we have the following minimax
theorem:
max
x
min
y
C(x,y) = min
y
max
x
C(x,y)
where x, y are pure strategies of MAL and SOC respectively and C(x,y) is the cost to SOC.
This shows that the order of play does not matter and it makes sense to talk about optimal
strategies for the players.
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We feel this is bit surprising for many reasons. Firstly, since both players have an infinite
number of strategies, it is not even clear why there should be an equilibrium even in mixed
strategies. Moreover, although our setting is that of a congestion game which have pure
equilibria, the game Gα is not a congestion game itself. Finally, the linear latencies are
required: there is an example of a two link game with simple convex latencies which has no
pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Another observation we make about Gα is that one of the optimal strategies for MAL
is to route its α-fraction of the flow selfishly, that is, what the equilibrium outcome would
have been if this α fraction were controlled by infinitesimal non-atomic agents each trying to
minimze its latency. In other words, a malicious player can inflict no more harm than a set of
selfish agents. Possibly, the malicious player could use a self-destructive strategy to degrade
the performance, but it somehow does not need to do so in linear congestion games.
Our next result bounds the Cost of Malice (CoM), a quantity which we use to measure
the effect of malicious players on the system. Formally, CoM is defined as the ratio of the
cost faced by the SOC player in an equilibrium of Gα to (1 − α)OPT, where OPT is the
socially optimum cost in the absence of malice, when the whole 1 unit was controlled by
the SOC player. Thus CoM in a way measures the effect of the malicious players on the
social optimum. As probably expected, in general congestion games CoM can be unbounded.
However, for linear load balancing games we show it to be bounded by (1 + α/2).
1.1 Related Work
In the computer science community, there have been a number of studies investigating the
effect of malicious agents in congestion games. The first work closest to our setting was by
Karakostas and Viglas [KV07] who study how the presence of malicious agents in a congestion
game effects the price of anarchy. That is, how the ratio between the cost of agents in a Nash
equilibrium and the social optimum, which the authors call the coordination ratio, change
with the amount of malice in the system. More recently, Babaioff et al [BKP07] consider the
malicious agent in the game along with the infinitesimal players and show that for general
latency functions, the game need not have a pure Nash equilibrium, and they show the
existence of a mixed Nash equilibrium. Moreover, they define the Price of Malice as the
rate of deterioration in the total performance of the remaining selfish players per unit flow of
malice and show that there exist networks where the price of malice may indeed be negative,
while on the other hand there are networks where the price could be quite large.
As we note in the introduction, the focus of the works above were on the effect of malice on
the equilibrium of the system: how the equilibrium degrades and how the game between the
selfish agents and the malicious agent takes place. On the other hand we are more interested
in how the presence of malice affects the social optimum itself. Thus our work complements
the works of Karakostas and Viglas [KV07] and Babaioff et al [BKP07].
The study of malice has not been restricted to the congestion game setting. Moscibroda
et al [MSW06] study the effect of malicious agents in a virus inoculation game. Indeed, they
also define a notion of price of malice as the ratio of the cost of an equilibrium setting with
and without malicious agents. The definition is not quite same as that of Babaioff et al
[BKP07]. In fact, to avoid a third “price of malice” definition, we call the effect of malice to
the optimum, the “cost of malice” instead.
Our work is in some sense similar to the work on Stackelberg strategies started by Rough-
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garden [Rou01] and later works by Karakostas and Kolliopoulos [KK07], Swamy [Swa07] and
Sharma and Williamson [SW07]. In Stackelberg games there exists a leader who controls
some amount of flow which he plays first to which the remaining selfish players respond. It
is instructive to compare this leader with our SOC player. In fact, our proof of bounding the
cost of malice goes via the strategy SCALE in the paper of Roughgarden [Rou01].
1.2 Notational Preliminaries
We establish a few notations before going on. We use the function br() to denote best-
response. Given MAL and SOC’s plays x and y, we write x ∼= br(y) if x is the best response
to y. We denote SOC-MAL := miny maxxC(x,y) as the minimum cost faced by the SOC
player when he plays first. We define MAL-SOC similarly. We will show the existence of a
pure Nash equilibrium by showing SOC-MAL = MAL-SOC.
We now review the properties of optimum and Nash flows in load balancing games. If
an amount of flow β ≤ 1 is to be routed on the m-links and moreover this flow is controlled
by infinitesimal non-atomic agents, then the resulting (unique) equilibrium flow, xˆ has the
following property:
xˆi > 0⇒ li(xˆi) ≤ lj(xˆj)
We call this flow, FN (β). If a single player controlling the whole β units of flow plays FN (β),
we say he is playing NASH.
If the β amount of flow is controlled by a single player wishing to minimize the total cost,
then the optimum flow xˆ satisfies the following property:
xˆi > 0 ⇒ li(xˆi) + xˆil′i(xˆi) ≤ lj(xˆj) + xˆjl′j(xˆj) (1)
We denote the total cost faced by the player as CS(β). Note that the cost of malice is defined
as CoM := sup
(x,y):Nash(Gα)
C(x,y)
(1− α)CS(1)
2 Existence of Pure Nash equilibrium in Linear Congestion
Games
Suppose the latency of the link i is given by li(x) = aix+bi. The following lemma characterizes
the best response of the MAL player to a SOC player’s play.
Lemma 2.1 Suppose the SOC player plays y. Then x is MAL’s best reponse to y if and
only if
xi > 0 ⇒ aiyi ≥ ajyj ∀j (2)
Proof: (Only if part) For xi > 0, we will prove that if ajyj > aiyi for some j, then MAL can
strictly increase the cost to SOC by moving his jobs from link i to link j. Let x′ be such that
x′k = xk, for k 6= i, j, with x′i = 0 and x′j = xj + xi. We have,
C(x′,y)− C(x,y) =
∑
k
akyk(x′k − xk)
= ajyjxi − aiyixi > 0
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(If part) Let L = max
k
akyk. For any x satisfying property 2, we have xi > 0 ⇒ aiyi = L.
Therefore, C(x,y) =
∑
k yk(ak(yk + xk) + bk) =
∑
k yklk(yk) + Lα
That is, the cost to SOC when MAL responds with any x satisfying property 2 is the
same, and has to be optimal from the only-if part. 2
Theorem 2.2 In any linear load balancing game, there exists pure strategies x,y of MAL
and SOC such that x ∼= br(y) and y ∼= br(x). Equivalently, there exists a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium in every load balancing game Gα.
Proof: Let x = Fn(α), that is MAL’s strategy is the NASH strategy. Then by definition of
NASH (see Section 1.2), we know that: xi > 0 ⇒ aixi + bi ≤ ajxj + bj , ∀j
Let us now characterize SOC’s best response: y ∼= br(x). Note that y is the strategy OPT
with the induced latencies l˜i(yi) = li(xi + yi). Therefore,
yi > 0 ⇒ l˜i(yi) + yi l˜′i(yi) ≤ l˜j(yj) + yj l˜′j(yj) ∀j
⇒ 2aiyi + aixi + bi ≤ 2ajyj + ajxj + bj ∀j
We now claim that x is in fact a best response to any such y. To show this, from
Lemma(2.1) it is enough to show
xi > 0 ⇒ aiyi ≥ ajyj ∀j
Consider i such that xi > 0 and any other j. If yj = 0 then the above inequality is trivially
true. Otherwise from the optimality property of y, we have 2ajyj+ajxj+bj ≤ 2aiyi+aixi+bi.
But since xi > 0, we have aixi + bi ≤ ajxj + bj . Therefore, aiyi ≥ ajyj . 2
Notice that one of the equilibrium pure strategies of the malicious player is NASH. Recall
that NASH is equivalent to the equilibrium reached by a set of selfish agents, each controlling
only an infinitesimal fraction of the flow. Hence, by the above min-max theorem, we conclude
that MAL can do no more harm than a set of selfish agents.
3 Bounding the Cost of Malice
In this section, we bound the cost of malice for linear load balancing games. Let s = FN (1)
be the NASH flow of value 1 in a load-balancing game. By definition latencies are equalized
by s on every link. Let L be this common latency. Then the total cost of this flow,
CN (1) =
∑
k
sklk(sk) = L
Lemma 3.1 In linear load balancing games, MAL-SOC ≤ (1− α)CN (1)
Proof: Suppose the player MAL plays x. We demonstrate a strategy for the SOC player
which gives him cost at most (1− α)CN (1). Define S = {i|xi ≥ si}. Let y be as follows
yi =
{
0 if i ∈ S
θi otherwise
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where θi is such that θi + xi ≤ si. Since
∑
k/∈S
(si − xi) ≥ (1 − α), such a y exists. Moreover,
since θi + xi ≤ si on each link used by SOC, the latency faced by SOC on any link is at most
L = CN (1). Therefore, MAL-SOC ≤ C(x,y) ≤ (1− α)CN (1) 2
Thus we get that no matter what MAL plays, SOC can always make sure that her cost is
at most (1 − α)CN (1). Therefore, using the theorem of Roughgarden and Tardos [RT02]
which bounds CN (1) and CS(1), in non-atomic linear load balancing games, we arrive at the
following bound on the cost of malice.
Theorem 3.2 In linear congestion games, SOC-MAL = MAL-SOC ≤ 43(1−α)CS(1). Thus
CoM ≤ 43 .
Note that in the above theorem, the cost of malice does not depend on the amount of malice.
In particular, even when there is no malice, we only get a bound of 4/3. In what follows, we
show that CoM ≤ (1 + α/2). This is a tighter bound when α ∈ [0, 2/3].
Consider the following simple strategy for SOC player called SCALE. This strategy was
suggested by Roughgarden [Rou01] in his study of Stackelberg scheduling strategies (although
SCALE was not a good strategy for his purposes). We are able to bound SOC’s cost which
in turn gives an upper bound on SOC-MAL.
SOC is said to follow SCALE if she simply plays y = (1 − α)y∗, where y∗ = FS(1), the
socially optimum flow. That is, she scales the strategy OPT down to a (1−α)-flow. Abusing
notation, we also denote by SCALE the value of C(x,y) when SOC follows SCALE.
Theorem 3.3 In linear load-balancing games,
SCALE ≤ (1 + α
2
)(1− α)CS(1)
and therefore CoM ≤ (1 + α/2).
Proof: By Lemma 2.1, we know that the best response of MAL is to pass all his flow through
the link that maximizes akxk. Without loss of generality, suppose MAL uses link 1 to send
all his flow. Then
SCALE =
m∑
k=1
yk(akyk + bk) + a1y1α
Replacing yk by (1− α)y∗k and using the fact that y∗k has cost CS(1), we get
SCALE = (1− α)2CS(1) + α(1− α)(a1y∗1 +
m∑
k=1
bky
∗
k).
Now we prove a1y∗1 +
∑m
k=1 bky
∗
k ≤ 32CS(1) which would complete the proof. As y∗ = FS(1),
y∗ obeys property 1. For linear latencies, it translates into:
y∗i > 0 ⇒ 2aiy∗i + bi = 2a1y∗1 + b1
Multiplying above equation by y∗i , we get
y∗i > 0 ⇒ aiy∗i 2 +
(bi − b1)
2
y∗i = a1y
∗
1y
∗
i
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Summing above equations over all y∗i > 0 and invoking
∑m
k=1 y
∗
k = 1, we get
a1y
∗
1 =
m∑
k=1
aky
∗
k
2 +
m∑
k=1
(bk − b1)
2
y∗k
Adding
∑m
k=1 bky
∗
k to both sides in above equation, we get
a1y
∗
1 +
m∑
k=1
bky
∗
k = CS(1) +
m∑
k=1
(bk − b1)
2
y∗k ≤
3
2
CS(1)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that
∑m
k=1(bk − b1)y∗k ≤
∑m
k=1 bky
∗
k ≤ CS(1).
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Remark: We should state that the analysis of the SCALE strategy in Theorem 3.3 is tight.
Consider the following two links with latencies (1,Mx). The social optimum is to send the
flows in the ratio
(
2M−1
2M ,
1
2M
)
and the optimum cost is 4M−14 . The SCALE strategy would
send flow as
(
(2M−1)(1−α)
2M ,
(1−α)
2M
)
and then MAL would send the α fraction on the second
link, leading to a cost (1−α)((4+2α)M−1)4M . Thus CoM =
(4+2α)M−1
4M−1 which goes to (1 + α/2) as
M goes to infinity. On the other hand if SOC sends all its (1− α) flow on the first link, the
cost of malice is 4M4M−1 which goes to 1 as M grows.
4 Malice in General Congestion Games
The zero-sum game between a malicious player MAL and a socially optimum player SOC
is also well defined for general congestion games as well. However, as we saw, the property
of having an equilibrium in pure-strategies breaks down when we go to non-linear latencies
even in the load-balancing case. A question which arises is if the existence in pure strategies
generalizes to general linear congestion games. In particular, does this property hold in
network congestion games. We believe the answer to be negative although we do not have
an example. Nevertheless, we do know of examples where MAL’s optimal strategy ceases to
play selfishly. Rather, in most examples we consider, the optimal strategy of MAL is to route
a flow which maximizes the minimum latency path.
Moreover, in network congestion games, the cost of malice can be large. A simple example
is a parallel link s-t network (which is the same as the load balancing game) with one extra
path from s to t which uses all the links. It is not hard to see that the best strategy of the
MAL player is to route all its flow on the extra path and then the cost-of-malice becomes
proportional to the number of parallel links.
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